Manipur: The Nexus Again

The nexus between establishment politicians and militants would be tragic if it had not become almost routine. On August 17, 2007, Manipur Police personnel raided the official residences of three Members of the State’s Legislative Assembly (MLAs), identified as W Brajabidhu, Bijoy Koijam, K. Meghachandra and a former MLA, N Sovakiran. These raids led to the arrest of 12 militants belonging to different insurgent groups operating in Manipur. An M-16 rifle, a 9mm pistol, live ammunition and a number of extortion notes were recovered from the house of one of the MLAs. Addressing a subsequent Press Conference, the State’s Director General of Police (DGP), Y. Joykumar Singh, said that the MLAs, all belonging to the Congress Party, were present in their houses during the raid and were unapologetic about the arrests. The MLAs later described charges of collusion as baseless. Till the writing of this report, no action had been taken against the errant politicians.

For years, Manipur has been wracked by an unending militancy, with some 15 active outfits presently operating in both its valley and hill areas. While militancy has shown signs of decline in some States of the Northeast, Manipur’s tryst with militant violence remains unrelenting, impacting on all the nine Districts of the State. For two successive years, 2005 and 2006, Manipur has been the most violent theatre of the conflict in the Northeast with 410 and 311 fatalities respectively. Assam, with 11 times the population, and 3.5 times the land area, accounted for 254 and 242 fatalities over the same period. Available data portends an equally dreadful year 2007. According to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the first six months of the current year recorded 184 fatalities, including 40 civilian and 25 security force (SF) deaths. The Institute for Conflict Management database indicates a total of 295 fatalities till October 10, 2007.

The vacuum in governance is both a consequence and cause of militancy in Manipur. The civil administration has ceased to function across vast stretches of the State and intermittent military operations have had little impact on the level of militancy. The militants have carved out several more or less ‘liberated zones’ within the State and also operate from neighbouring Myanmar’s Sagaing Division, carry out attacks targeting civilians, SF personnel and Government servants, and run an enveloping extortion network across the State – extending right into the capital city – with impunity.

Certainly, politicians in the State are under tremendous pressure, and militant attack on leaders and party workers have been a recurrent phenomenon. Over the past months, such incidents have included:

• June 10: A girl, identified as Nabizam alias Baby alias Boilar, sustained injuries in a grenade attack by unidentified militants at the residence of a former legislator, Abdul Salam, at Hatta Golapati in the Imphal East District.
• July 22: At least six armed militants waylaid the Wangoi legislator, Salam Joy Singh and his five-man Police escort at Irom Meijrao, under Wangoi Police station in the Imphal West district. The militants overpowered the escort personnel and decamped with their service weapons.
• July 29: Unidentified militants fired some rounds at the residence of the legislator Thangjam Nandakishore in connection with a monetary demand at Thambalkhong in the Imphal East District.
• August 2: Suspected militants hurled a bomb at the residence of legislator Joy Singh at Kakwa in the Imphal West District, though no causality was reported. Singh had objected to the militants’ demand for a percentage of the MLA’s Area Development Fund.
• August 7: A group of ten suspected militants attacked the convoy of State Education Minister L. Jayentakumar, and MLAs, Dr. M. Ratankumar and Th. Lokeshor, near Khudengthabi and Lokchao on the Imphal-Moreh section of National Highway (NH) – 39, though the targets escaped unhurt.
• August 8: Suspected militants hurled a grenade at the private residence of Congress Party MLA, Moirangthem Oken Singh, at Heirok in the Thoubal District. The grenade landed on the outhouse but did not explode.
• August 20: Suspected militants hurled a hand grenade at the residence of a legislator, L. Nandakumar Singh of the Congress party, at Nagamapal in the Imphal West District. The grenade failed to explode.
• September 14: Unidentified militants attacked the residence of MLA and Chairman of the Manipur Pollution Control Board, E. Dijamani Singh, at Hiyanglam in the Thoubal District. No injury was reported.

In militancy-ridden Manipur, buying peace with the militants is commonplace and is seen across the political spectrum simply as a strategy of survival. The nexus between politicians and militants is, consequently, pervasive. As former Manipur Governor Ved Marwah expressed it, "There are hardly any politicians in Manipur of any stature who do not have links with the insurgent groups."

In December 2005, the then Army Chief J.J. Singh stirred a hornet’s nest by claiming that Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh had paid a ‘donation’ of INR Five million to the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and INR 10 million to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chief Minister and the KYKL rejected the allegation. However, while describing the charge as "forgery, cheating and political victimization", the KYKL admitted that it receives financial help from ‘different people’, including politicians, though "not as much as INR Five million from a single individual".

In addition to Ibobi Singh, there is a long list of politicians, including Chief Ministers, who have been similarly accused of buying or attempting to buy peace with the militants. In the late 1980s, the then Manipur Governor, General K.V. Krishna Rao, accused then Chief Minister Rishang Keishing of contributing INR Three million to the coffers of the then undivided National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Keishing’s linkages with the Naga militants found mention in another State Governor’s report, when Lieutenant General V.K. Nayyar accused him as well as another senior State politician, R.K. Dorendro, of financing the NSCN. Keishing, during another stint as Chief Minister in the mid 1990s, was accused of supplying uniforms to the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM). Investigations into this incident were allegedly hushed up and the blame was eventually pushed off on to a Manipur Rifles Commandant. In 2000, at least five State Ministers were accused of reportedly contributing funds and official vehicles to unnamed militant outfits and even participated in the funerals of militants killed in encounters with the SFs. A State Government inquiry was ordered, but was never completed.

Both politics and militancy in the Northeast are rooted in ethnicity and the nexus between the two power centres is inherently linked to such primordial loyalties. Both militants and politicians share a common support base. Instead of choosing to confront each other and erode the support base, both tend to collaborate and benefit from the prevailing state of affairs. In 2003, Manipur Power Minister Phungzathang, belonging to the Zomi tribe, provided two vehicles and a sum of INR 260,000 to the militants of the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA). Similarly, the Naga MLAs in Manipur have often openly spoken in favour of the NSCN-IM’s demand for the merger of Naga-inhabited areas of the State with Nagaland. These politicians have periodically led delegations to the highest echelons in New Delhi in support of these demands.

New Delhi’s intermittent attempts at breaking the nexus display a lack of sincerity. In 1997, an ‘action plan’ drawn up by the MHA, following then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral's visit to the Northeast, proposed a vigilance system to monitor the politician-militant nexus in the region. In 2001, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee decided to set up a judicial inquiry into the charges of the politician-militant nexus in the region. Nothing has been heard of either ‘initiative’ since the respective announcements. In August 2007, reports unveiled another of New Delhi’s proposed mechanisms to counter the nexus and the militant extortion network. The proposed mechanism involves setting up of local units of the Enforcement Directorate (An agency under the Ministry of Finance, which investigates financial irregularities) and in coordination with the banking sector, to evolve an anti-dote to the thriving problem. It remains to be seen whether this new proposal will have any eventual impact on the ground, or whether it will go the way of its predecessors.

The nexus between politicians and militants has conveniently been described as a natural corollary to Manipur’s thriving militancy. Notwithstanding occasional action by the enforcement agencies – as in the present raids and arrests – these linkages have sustained militancy for decades, providing the militants a steady source of finance and at least some safety from SF operations. Stringent punitive action could have been a decisive deterrent to such alliances. Regrettably, errant politicians have, so far, retained complete immunity against the ‘long arm of the law’.

Manipur: The Colour Red

Maoist ambitions in India now extend to the farthest reaches of the country, and this is not just a fantasy or an aspiration, but a strategy, a projection, a plan and a programme under implementation… (T)he Maoists’… inventory of ‘immediate tasks’ (includes)… ‘Coordinate the people’s war with the ongoing armed struggles of the various oppressed nationalities in… Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and other parts of the Northeast.’ South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 5, No. 31, February 12, 2007

Manipur has long been stained by the incessant bloodshed of its multiple and fratricidal insurgencies, but October 21, 2008, will go down as a moment of reckoning for security planners in India. The day witnessed the single biggest militant attack, in terms of fatalities, in the recorded history of militancy in Manipur, as 18 persons, including three security force (SF) personnel, were killed in an explosion targeting a game of lagao (dice gambling) in the Ragailong area of capital Imphal; far more significantly, on the same day, one of the State’s leading militant formations, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) inked a three-point pact with the Left Wing extremist Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) – the group is already known to be active in over 220 Districts in 22 States across the country – calling for consolidation of "mutual understanding and friendship" to "overthrow the common enemy", the "reactionary regime of India". The latter event, far more than the first, bears the potential of transforming the very character of militancy in the State.

Amidst utter confusion regarding the identity of the militant group responsible for the explosion, the Military Council (MC) faction of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) claimed responsibility for the attack. A statement released by the group’s ‘military affairs secretary’ Lanheiba Meitei on October 22, said that the blast was directed at teaching the State as well as central SFs (Army and the para-military forces) a lesson for ‘promoting dice gambling’, which is "alien to the culture of Manipur". Threatening to carry out more attacks in future, the outfit warned people to stay clear of the SFs and not to organise protests condemning the blast. It is customary for militant formations in Manipur, seen to be ‘sons of the soil’, to express their remorse at any unintended loss of civilian lives in the aftermath of an attack. On this occasion, however, the KCP-MC chose to do away with such formalities.

According to data till August 31, 2008, Manipur is now the most violent State in India’s North Eastern region. Compared to 209 fatalities in the neighbouring (and much larger) State of Assam, which saw the highest numbers killed in 2007, Manipur has recorded 314 fatalities. Of these, 65 per cent were militants killed. In spite of recurrently high fatality rates in militant ranks over the past several years – 56 per cent of 388 in 2007; 60 per cent of 311 in 2006; and 49 per cent of 410 in 2005 – there appears to be no visible decline in the overall dominance exercised by the 15 active militant groups in the State. Indeed, Manipur is proof of the reality that killings alone do not exhaust the debate on militancy. Rampant incidents of abduction and extortion; the forcible closure of business, educational and Government establishments; militant decrees targeting the day to day lives of the people; and attacks on senior officials and politicians, including the Chief Minister and his Cabinet colleagues; have contributed significantly to an atmosphere of abject insecurity and chaos in this State.

Militancy related fatalities 2003-2008

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008*
Incidents	243	478	554	498	584	465
Civilians	50	88	158	96	130	96
SFs	27	36	50	28	39	12
Militants	128	134	202	187	219	206
TOTAL	205	258	410	311	388	314

* Data till August 31, 2008
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

Against this backdrop, a pact between one of the State’s most potent militant groups and the CPI-Maoist – the architect of the most menacing and rapidly augmenting insurgency in India – has unprecedented significance, not only for Manipur, but for the Northeast region in entirety and, indeed, for the country at large.

The joint declaration by the PLA and the CPI-Maoist followed a two day meeting between the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF, the political wing of the PLA) and the CPI-Maoist at the ‘Council Headquarters’ of the former at an unspecified location in Manipur on October 21 and 22. According to the three point pact, both the PLA and the CPI-Maoist would, henceforth,

• Honour and support the sovereignty of the two ‘countries’ (the sovereignty of India and the sovereignty of Manipur);
• Extend full moral and political support to each other in the liberation struggles to overthrow the common enemy, ‘the Indian reactionary and oppressive regime’
• Recognise and honour the historically endorsed territorial integrity of the two ‘countries’, namely Manipur and India.

The pact is a natural culmination of Maoist strategy, and represents a pattern which can be expected to be repeated with other groups within Manipur as well as with militant outfits in other States of the Northeast. SAIR, in its previous issues, has detailed the ascent of the Maoist movement in India and had noted increasing Maoist mobilisation and consolidation in pockets of several North Eastern States. In this context, the pact with the RPF/PLA further underlines the Maoist potential to engulf the entire country, contradicting the scenario of a constrained and limited Maoist presence repeatedly projected by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

The inroads the CPI-Maoist are making in the Northeast come as no surprise. The essentially socialist outlook of a majority of the insurgent movements in the Northeast and their abhorrence of the ‘domination of a colonial India’, make them natural allies of the CPI-Maoist. The ethnicity-based insurgencies of the Northeast are, moreover, progressively approaching exhaustion or have been trapped in an unending and un-winnable stalemate with SFs for years, making them attractive targets of a Maoist effort to ‘mop up’ their surviving potential in alliances or, eventually, under the Maoist banner. Manipur is also the locus of the most abject collapse of governance, with vast areas virtually abandoned by the state, a terrain that is difficult for SF operations, and administrative instrumentalities that have been dysfunctional for decades; in sum, ideal territory for Maoist mobilisation and strategic extension.

The movement into Manipur – and, indeed, other theatres of the Northeast – was also inevitable in terms of the repeatedly articulated strategy of the Maoists. The Maoist Party Programme document unambiguously expresses its solidarity with armed militant movements in other parts of the country including the Northeast.

The struggles of the Kashmiri, Naga, Assamese, Manipuri and other nationalities in north-eastern region are already going on by assuming the armed form. The people of these oppressed nationalities are not only fighting for their identity but also for the just cause of achieving their honourable right of self-determination, including the right of secession and the demand for secession… Our party must unequivocally support these nationalities’ struggles. It must also resolutely oppose the vicious attempt of the Indian ruling classes to suppress these movements with their military might. The right of self-determination including, and up to, the right of secession, must be firmly upheld and highlighted in all circumstances.

Similarly, Maoist Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution document makes it obligatory for the party to "be in the forefront of every democratic demand of the nationalities whether it is for autonomy; for equal status for their languages; for separate statehood; against economic, social cultural and other forms of oppression by a certain dominant nation."

The alliance between the Maoists and the RPF/PLA will have defining impact on the course of the insurgencies in Manipur – though it is not expected to result in any extraordinary spike in violence in the immediate future. The PLA can, however, be expected to gain in strength over the coming months, profiting from its strategic alliance with a powerful nation-wide insurgency, particularly in terms of improvements in training, tactics and strategies of irregular warfare which the Maoists have evolved to a fine art. Significantly, the RPF/PLA’s camaraderie with other Manipuri insurgent groupings such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) [the three constitute an umbrella organisation, the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF)] and the UNLF’s strategic linkages with the KCP-MC, would suggest that the pact with the Maoists could gradually be extended to embrace all these outfits.

The KCP-MC, created out of a split in its parent group in the last quarter of 2007, has seen phenomenal growth in its brief existence. Irrespective of its actual involvement in the October 21 explosion, the Institute for Conflict Management database records 80 incidents involving the KCP-MC before this last incident. With an estimated 110 active cadres, the group’s activities include abduction, extortion, attacks on politicians, bureaucrats and SFs and the imposition of several dictates and restrictions on the media. The group’s cadres have been described by the Police as ‘experts’ in manufacturing improvised explosives devices (IEDs). With 370 kilometres of the 1,640 kilometre-long open and porous Indo-Myanmar border running along Manipur, smuggling of small arms and explosives from the Southeast Asian arms markets is not particularly difficult. KCP-MC, like any other militant formation in the region with surplus funds, faces little challenge in going in for a radical makeover.

At present, no area in Manipur – either in the Valley or the Hills, including the State capital Imphal – is free from militant activities. A lion’s share of the violence is, however, orchestrated by the Valley-based Meitei groups (like the KCP-MC, UNLF, PLA, PREPAK), who accounted for over 63 per cent of the total 465 incidents reported till August 31, 2008. Imphal, spread over 30.75 square kilometres, has been described by the Manipur Home Department as the nerve and extortion centre of militant activity. The Institute for Conflict Management database records at least 170 militancy related incidents in and around Imphal in the current year alone. Heavy security presence in the capital does not appear to have deterred the militants in the least. Just two days before the October 21 explosion, PREPAK militants had executed a grenade attack right in front of the Chief Minister’s bungalow, breaching high levels of security.

Given the character of militancy in Manipur – especially in the four valley Districts (Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishnupur and Thoubal) – the State Police, which is familiar with the intricacies of the conflict and its key players, should have the lead role in counter-insurgency (CI) operations, backed by the Army and Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs). Manipur has a healthy Police-population ratio (Policemen per 100,000 population) of 554 and Police density (Policemen per 100 square kilometre area) of 63.8, as against the All India averages of 126 and 44.4 respectively. However, the Force has a current vacancy of 28 per cent against a sanctioned strength of 22,936 men. Worse, the Police have preferred to relinquish all initiative in CI operations, allowing the Army and CPMFs to shoulder virtually the entire burden. Despite the creation of a Unified Command Structure in the State in 2004, to coordinate the activities of the Police, the Army and the CPMFs, there has been little operational improvement.

Authorities in Manipur insist that popular support for the militants is on a decline, but this is difficult to reconcile with the realities of the ground. Public opinion in Manipur has been hijacked by community-based organisations, which have little influence on the militant outfits, but which are deeply divisive and partisan, either favouring particular armed underground groups, or ambivalent in their approach towards militant violence. The influential United Committee Manipur (UCM), for instance, has maintained a studied silence on KNF-MC excesses and attributed the October 21 explosion to the "inherent weakness and total failure of the Government in maintaining law and order." Another prominent ‘civil society’ group, the All Manipur United Clubs' Organisation (AMUCO) has implicitly supported insurgent activity and responded to the October 21 attack with qualified criticism, stating: "regardless of the non-state or state actors or agencies who may have been perpetrators, this should never be considered a part of the ongoing armed conflict since the attack targeted a crowded place." The ethnically polarized civilian population has tended to seek refuge in an imaginary insularity which offers no protection, but which has prevented the consolidation of public opinion against the militancy and violence that dominate State politics. The State leadership, in turn, has failed comprehensively in managing the minimal tasks of governance and in executing its basic duty to protect the lives and properties of citizens.

There have been repeated calls by the State leadership – including the Chief Minister – for a dialogue with the insurgent groups and a negotiated ‘solution’ to Manipur’s multiple insurgencies and this has been picked up by the security establishment as well. On October 24, 2008, a senior officer of the para-military Assam Rifles called for a ‘political dialogue’ between the militants and the Government to secure a ‘lasting solution’ to the enduring conflict in the State. Such an approach, however, ignores a long historical record that demonstrates that insurgent groups almost never engage in good-faith negotiations when they are in an ascendant – and it is more than evident that Manipur’s militants are fighting anything but a losing battle. With the new alliance between the RPF/PLA and the Maoists – and the potential for further consolidation of the Maoist presence and support to the militancy in the State, Manipur is heading for an insurgency far more intractable than the disorders it has experience in the past. Unless the security establishment addresses this augmenting challenge with determination and a strategic perspective far more coherent than is currently manifest, the situation in Manipur threatens to hurtle entirely out of control.

Assam: The Costs of Insurgency

Leading corporate groups in India, including Reliance Industries and the Tata Group, are keen to invest in Assam following a marked improvement in the State's overall security situation, according to Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi. On November 4, 2006, Gogoi said, “Today I am getting investors from across the country, including big players like the Tata Group, willing to set up businesses here.”

Corporate heavyweights like the Reliance Industries, the Tata’s Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services, and Videocon Industries, are expected to invest INR 300 billion in the development of rural infrastructure, promotion of agriculture and the setting up power plants, IT parks, and other projects. An expansive Gogoi declared, “Investors look for security and an environment that is peaceful. A few years back, the situation here was not conducive enough to attract big investors. But today the situation has changed and peace is dawning in Assam and hence a suitable climate for business to grow here.'

The Chief Minister's boast of the dawning of peace may, however, seem somewhat premature. On November 5, fourteen persons were killed and at least 50 sustained injuries in twin bomb blasts in the Noonmati and Fancy Bazaar areas of Guwahati city. Indeed, Gogoi simultaneously confessed, on November 6, that the State Government has failed to provide security to the people of Assam: “I have to admit that we have failed to provide security but we have taken this development very seriously and operations against the militants have been intensified.” There was evidence of a worsening of the security scenario since October 2006. At least 27 bomb explosions occurred during October 1-November 24 period, while, between January and September, there were a total of 43 blasts across the State. At least 151 people, including 82 civilians and 30 Security Force (SF) personnel, have died in insurgency-related incidents in 2006.

Jayanta Madhab, a noted economist from the region, injected a note of sobriety in the current and sanguine assessments of Assam’s economic potential, arguing that insurgency has always played a negative role so far as enticing outside investment is concerned. The persistent insurgency has substantially weakened the productive capacities of Assam’s socio-economic infrastructure. Consequently, the productivity of capital is low compared to other States. Assam is one of India’s poorer states with about 36 percent of its population of 27 million living below the poverty line and per capita income (INR 13,925) 40 per cent below the national average. The State is marked by poor road infrastructure, tenuous communications, low agricultural productivity, and low levels of industrial activity. According to a study by the Planning Commission, between 1980 and 1990, per capita income at 1980-81 prices grew by 20 per cent in Assam, compared to 40 per cent for the entire country. The period 1980 – 1998 was worse, with per capita income in Assam growing by just 10 per cent as against 39 per cent at the all India level.

Domestic industry has been variously affected by the insurgency. While there have been the more direct attacks on physical infrastructure and manpower, there are also substantial costs incurred through extortion and ‘levy’ charges. In the latter case, some instances of non-compliance have translated into attacks against and murders of managerial cadres and businessmen. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), moreover, continues with its random depredations, bombing markets and public places, as well as oil and gas pipelines and other key installations.

The oil and tea industry, the mainstays of Assam’s economy, has been targeted by the ULFA virtually since the creation of the group. The outfit has blown up oil pipelines and installations, abducted officials, and killed personnel and official, including a Russian petrochemical engineer engaged by the Oil India Limited (OIL) in the Sate. OIL sources indicate that the number of explosions targeting oil and gas pipelines in 1996 was 1; 1997: 1; 1998: 1; 1999: 3; 2000: 3; 2003: 2; 2004: 7; 2005: 12; 2006: 2 (till November 23). Further, sources disclosed that the vital crude oil pipeline from Duliajan through Bongaigaon in Assam, to Barauni in the Begusarai district of Bihar, was repeatedly sabotaged by militants in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998, causing massive disruption to the oil industry. According to SATP data, 11 explosions were triggered by ULFA, targeting oil and gas installations in 2006 (till November 23). India produces about 30 million tonnes of crude oil annually, with Assam accounting for about five million tonnes of the total. The State has over 1.3 billion tonnes of proven crude oil and 156 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, of which about an estimated 58 percent of existing hydrocarbon reserves are yet to be explored.

In January 2006, ULFA sent alarm bells ringing in the State's industry and security establishment by slapping an INR 5 billion (USD 112 million) extortion demand on the state-owned Indian oil major, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), forcing the authorities to intensify the vigil on oil and gas installations across the State. Then, on July 3, 2006, the Reserve Bank of India, the country's central bank, was served an extortion demand for INR 1.5 million by ULFA. Further, on November 2, 2006, ULFA threatened to strongly resist OIL exploration of petroleum oil in the Brahmaputra basin. A statement issued by the group read: “The Indian Government has for long been exploiting Assam's natural resources and now it plans to extract oil from the Brahmaputra. This is nothing but another clever attempt to take away local resources at the cost of our people… We shall not allow such a thing to take place.” The threat followed an agreement worth USD 22 million signed by OIL with Kazakhstan Caspi Shelf, a Kazakhstan-based oil exploration firm, to conduct a 2-D seismic survey along 175 kilometres of the Brahmaputra River in Assam. Paresh Baruah, the ‘commander-in-chief’ of ULFA, in a statement made on June 10, 2006, claimed that the attacks on pipelines were carried out ‘in protest against’ the tightening of security around oil installations, which was to "facilitate the plundering of Assam's natural resources."

ULFA’s sabotage targeting the oil sector has coincided with opposition to oil exploration projected through a section of civil society organisations, especially certain environmental groups. Conservationists are worried about the possibility of oil exploration impacting on the survival of highly endangered freshwater dolphins and other aquatic species living in the Brahmaputra basin. While joining the campaign to block oil exploration in the basin, the ULFA found in such ecological issues an opportunity to legitimize its subversive operation targeting the oil industry. The outfit also identified, in its publication Freedom, another vulnerable ecological space, Dibru-Saikhowa National Park, which could be affected by oil exploration. ULFA accused a British oil firm, Premier Oil, of harming the ecology of the Dihing Patkai Forest Reserve in the name of oil exploration.

The Central Industrial Security Force is currently responsible for the security of oil installations. However, it is concerned primarily with guarding the installations, leaving the pipelines – mostly underground – vulnerable to attacks.

Apart from the oil industry, other sectors like tea estates, the banking sector, railways and communications are also being subjected to disruption by the insurgents through extortion, abductions and violent attacks on a regular basis. The tea industry (the State has some 800 tea gardens) is another vital economic construct of Assam, with an output of 475 million kilograms, more than 50 per cent of the total national tea production of 928 million kilograms. Sections of the tea industry have blamed the Union Government and its recent peace initiatives (which collapsed on September 20, 2006) with the ULFA for the spurt in terrorist activities. One industry leader was quoted as stating: "In the last one month [September], as the Army officials moved out of the valley, the ULFA activists regrouped and we started receiving the extortion notices and the situation drastically deteriorated." On September 17, the ULFA served an extortion note to the Nagrijuli tea estate in the Baksa District demanding INR 10 million. On September 19, it served an extortion notice to a tea garden in upper Assam's Dibrugarh District belonging to tea major Mcleod Russel, demanding INR 10 million. And on September 23, four ULFA cadres shot dead Haren Das, a manager of the Hailanga Tea Estate in front of his residence in Digboi town. On September 22, a policeman was killed in an encounter with the ULFA in Dibrugarh District, when a police team had gone to arrest an ULFA activist who had allegedly handed over an extortion notice of INR 800,000 to the manager of Sessa Tea Estate. Earlier, the Ramanugger Tea Estate in Karbi Anglong District was closed down on July 5 following the abduction of its Assistant Manager, N. Bora, from his residence by unidentified militants. Even before the truce collapsed, the ULFA had reportedly stepped up extortion demands from tea plantations. Dhiraj Kakati, secretary of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association, articulated the industry’s concerns: “They’re very vulnerable, living in isolated areas and working outdoors… They can’t afford to pay — they can barely meet their own costs.”

During his presentation at a meeting of the Strategy Group of the Unified Command in Guwahati on October 11, 2006, the General Manager of the Northeast Frontier Railway, A.K. Sanwalka, sought adequate security for the Lumding-Silchar gauge-conversion work. He said only 37 per cent of the work of the INR 1,500-crore project had been completed. "Black Widow," an anti-talks faction of the Dimasa militant outfit Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), had been demanding a 10 per cent cut from every contractor involved in the project. It had also been serving extortion notices to others in the North Kachar Hills and Karbi Anglong areas of Assam.

The modernization of the oil industry lies at the heart of the development of Assam, since every region develops its own pattern of industrialisation depending on the type of natural resources it has. The oil industry and other economic sectors can only prosper when basic governance is assured, not only in terms of providing physical infrastructure, but also in ensuring adequate security for industrial enterprise against the anti-development agenda of violent non-state actors. Expressions of interest in the State from the corporate sector notwithstanding, such a situation is still far from the realities of the ground in Assam. 

Assam: Court’s Slap to Politics of Citizenship

Assam’s murky politics of citizenship, on which elections have been won or lost in the State for more than fifteen years now, stands finally exposed. The Supreme Court on December 5, 2006, struck down the Union Government’s February 10, 2006 notification that had put the onus of proving an illegal migrant in Assam on the complainant, and not on the accused, as is the case with the law that applies to all such people of doubtful nationality in the rest of the country. What India’s apex court quashed was the Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order, 2006, which, if not a clone of the controversial Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) (IM[DT]) Act, 1983, had the same contentious provision — vesting the burden of proof for an alleged illegal migrant on the complainant or investigating agency. Incidentally, the Supreme Court, acting on an earlier petition by the then President of the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) Member of Parliament, Sarbananda Sonowal, had struck down the IM[DT] Act, on July 12, 2005, terming it as unconstitutional (referred to as Sonowal - I). Everywhere else in India, foreigners or illegal migrants are governed in accordance with the Foreigners Act, 1946.

When the IM[DT] Act was struck down ten months ahead of the State Assembly elections in Assam (polls were held in April 2006), there was an attempt by minority political forces in the State (read, those who support the outsider Muslim settlers who are a dominant factor in Assam’s electoral politics, controlling up to 50 of the State’s 126 Assembly seats) to cash in on the fear that even bona fide citizens belonging to the minority community could face harassment. The ruling Congress party in Assam, bent on returning to power, had to allay this apprehension among the minorities, and it helped that the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance was in power at the Centre. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh constituted a Group of Ministers, with Pranab Mukherjee, then Defence Minister, to examine the fallout of the quashing of the IM[DT] Act, particularly its impact on the minorities. It was on the recommendation of the Group of Ministers that New Delhi came up with the February 10, 2006, Order. This was immediately challenged by leaders of two main Opposition parties in the State, the AGP and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The core question was, why should Assam have a different immigration law in force or why should the illegal migrants coming to Assam be treated differently from those who have migrated to other parts of the country? This extremely valid question has been posed by many over the years, but the answer itself is not hard to find: politics, obviously. It is this politics that explains why the AGP, which was formed in 1985 with the avowed objective of ridding Assam of ‘illegal aliens’ (Bangladeshi migrants) and succeeded in ruling the State for almost ten years over two terms, could manage to ‘expel’ only around 1,500 illegal Bangladeshi migrants. Whether Dhaka, which insists there is no illegal migration of its citizens to India, accepted these people as their nationals, is a different story.

On the present occasion, after the IM[DT] Act was declared ultra vires of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, the Congress had to appear as the saviour of Assam’s minorities. This was despite the fact that the Foreigners Act, 1946, has strong provisions to ensure that genuine citizens are not harassed in the name of determining the nationality of a person or proving his or her citizenship.

It is interesting to take a look at the arguments put forward by Congress leaders and the Union Government: Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi stated that the February 10, 2006, notification, which amended the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, was effected by the Union Government to ensure that genuine Indian citizens belonging to the minority community are not harassed during the process of detecting illegal migrants. The Union Government, on its part, during the Supreme Court proceedings on the case, sought to dispel the impression that the controversial Order had shifted the burden of proof on the complainants. The Centre argued that the February notification did not ‘in any way’ contravene Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, on the question of burden of proof. However, the Court remarked that if there was no difference between the 1964 Order and the latest one, where was the need to amend the 1964 Order and come up with the fresh one? And, further,

No reasons are given to justify the exclusion. In making the 1964 order inapplicable to Assam alone, when the other States having boundaries with Bangladesh, are still expected to apply that order, the respondents have acted arbitrarily and have not kept in mind the interests of the country. No rational reason has been put forward to justify such a separate treatment for Assam especially in the context of the report of the then Governor [highlighting the problem of illegal migrants].

The Court added, moreover, "it appears that the 2006 order has been issued just as a cover up for non implementation of the directions of this Court issued in Sonowal-I", and concluded,

In the face of the clear directions issued in Sonowal-I, it was for the authority concerned to strengthen the Tribunals under the 1964 Order and to make them work. Instead of doing so, the 2006 Order has been promulgated.

It is not that Assam’s main Opposition party, the AGP, has not tried to woo the ‘minorities’ to its fold. On the eve of the State Assembly polls in April 2006, the AGP set up a ‘minority cell’ manned by several Muslim party members. This move was seen as an attempt by the AGP to send a signal out to Muslim voters that the party was not against the community, and that it was only against illegal aliens.

What is extremely important while discussing the contentious migration issue in Assam is to understand that the State of 26 million people comprises indigenous Assamese-speaking Muslims, indigenous Bengali-speaking Muslims (who dominate the Southern Barak Valley Districts), and the Muslim settlers whose origins can be traced to erstwhile East Bengal, now Bangladesh. The Assam Accord of 1985 had fixed March 25, 1971, as the cut-off date for detection and expulsion of illegal migrants, meaning that all those people from present Bangladesh who had entered Assam on or before that date would be regarded as Indian citizens, and the rest were to be detected and expelled. The issue of illegal migration refers only to those people from Bangladesh who illegally entered India after March 25, 1971.

Unfortunately, many politicians and analysts fail to make a clear distinction between the immigrant settlers or illegal migrants and the indigenous Muslims of Assam. That makes the State’s politics murkier still, because the total Muslim population in Assam is estimated at 30 per cent of the State’s population of 26 million.

The security implications of illegal migration are now becoming increasingly urgent. This issue gave rise to the State’s principal insurgency led by the United Liberation Front of Asom (

ULFA), though this outfit now has little ideological content or connection with its original mandate and objectives. Worse, it is now common knowledge that Bangladesh is progressively turning into a hub of Islamist terror, with radical groups linked to the Al-Qaeda well-entrenched in that country. With a porous border with India stretching more than 4,000 kilometers running along rivers and croplands, inadequate security posts and poor deployment of Forces along the border, trans-border movement is a common phenomenon in the area. Further, with any number of Northeast Indian insurgent groups operating from bases and safe havens in Bangladesh, it is all the more important to stop the illegal influx, as also to detect and expel all illegal migrants.

No wonder the Supreme Court while quashing the February 10 Order reminded the Union Government of its obligations to protect the country from external aggression, noting that

‘It (the February 10 order) does not serve the purpose sought to be achieved by the 1946 (Foreigners) Act or the Citizenship Act and the obligations cast on the Central Government to protect the nation in terms of Article 355 of the Constitution…’

The Court’s observation on the national security aspect must not be taken as a mere cautionary note. It needs to be recognized that most recent Islamist terrorist attacks in India, including the 7/11 blasts in Mumbai, the serial blasts in Varanasi in March 2006, the attack at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, in March 2005, and the suicide bombing at the Special Task Force Headquarters of the Andhra Pradesh Police in Hyderabad on October 12, 2005, all had a Bangladeshi ‘footprint’. Indian investigators found that these incidents were carried out by terrorists who had infiltrated from Bangladesh and some of whom were Bangladeshi nationals, or were otherwise sourced or serviced through Bangladesh. A Government status paper presented in the Indian Parliament in the first week of December 2006 observed that Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed (now Khuddam-ul-Islam) and Lashker-e-Taiba (now Jamaat-ud-Dawa) are using territory and ‘elements’ in Bangladesh and Nepal for movement of terrorists and finances.

What has, however, kept the issue alive in Assam for more than a decade-and-a-half is the misuse on many occasions in the past of provisions in the Foreigners Act, 1946, where overzealous police or administrative officials served notices on genuine Muslim citizens, including Assamese-speaking inhabitants, to prove their nationality. Such instances were also, unfortunately, the result of petty politics, not acts of honest law enforcement.

Today, there is euphoria in Assam yet again, after the Court struck off a provision that was soft on illegal migrants seen by many as part of Bangladesh’s grand design for a ‘demographic invasion’ of Assam. Groups like the AASU, which had spearheaded the six-year-long anti-foreigner (anti-illegal Bangladeshi migrants) agitation in the eighties, celebrated the verdict. What the AASU has always found hard to explain is the reason why its leadership accepted the IM[DT] Act, which was legislated in 1983 to further an agreement with the Union Government to end AASU’s agitation two years later (in August 1985) under the watchful eyes of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The fact remains that, irrespective of whether a soft or a tough law exists by which to deal with foreigners or illegal migrants, cross-border human traffic along the Indo-Bangladesh border is bound to continue in times to come. The catch lies in enforcing the law in whatever form it exists, not in celebrating the ‘dustbinning’ of a certain provision perceived to be favourable to illegal migrants. Unless the politics of citizenship comes to an end in Assam, illegal Bangladeshis will keep coming in.

Jihad for Greater Bangladesh: Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)

The Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) was founded sometime in the year 1996. MULTA is one among the approximately 14 Islamist terrorist outfits reportedly operating in the State of Assam. MULTA and the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) are also said to be part of the All Muslim United Liberation Forum of Assam (AMULFA). AMULFA was reportedly founded to coordinate the subversive activities of Islamist terrorist elements in the Northeast region of India. Though its time of founding is not known, MULFA is believed to have taken shape at the behest of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the external intelligence agency of Pakistan. The then Chief Minister (CM) of Assam, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, in his statement on the floor of the Assam Legislative Assembly on ISI activities in the State, on April 6, 2000, said MULTA and MULFA were being guided by the ISI. Mahanta further claimed that the ISI had drafted a plan to cause subversion in the State by appealing to the religious sentiments of vulnerable sections in the society, in Assam.

Leadership & Cadre Strength

Available reports have, thus far, not been able to home in on the names of the leadership of MULTA. Similarly, the cadre strength of the outfit is yet not known. However, security forces have arrested many MULTA cadres and several more have also surrendered to the authorities in the State. A majority of MULTA cadres, reports indicate, are drawn from the poorer sections of the Muslim population in the State and have no more than minimal formal education.

Aims & Objectives

Reportedly, MULTA, as is allegedly the case with the other Islamist terrorist outfits in the State, seeks to mobilize the Muslim youth in Assam to 'fight' for the 'cause' of Muslims. Reports have also indicated that the outfit has as its objective the merger of Assam into Bangladesh under the fanatic dream of Greater Bangladesh, to eventually set up a 'greater independent Islamistan' for the Muslims of Assam. MULTA cadres, in fact, reports suggest, are attempting to emulate the terrorist outfits operating in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, and claiming that they are waging jehad against the Indian state.

Linkages

The outfit has established both intra and inter-regional linkages. Reports suggest it has linkages with the National Socialist Council of Nagland -Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM). NSCN-IM operates primarily in Nagaland. The NSCN-IM has allegedly provided training to MULTA cadres in the Jiribam jungles. Some reports even indicated that cadres of other Assam-based terrorist outfits championing the Islamic cause in Assam, too, had trained with the NSCN-IM.

MULTA is also said to be a constituent of the United Reformation Protest of India (URPI), another organisation that claims to be a platform for various Islamic terrorist outfits operating in the Northeast. A MULTA cadre arrested on July 9, 2002, in Bilasipara, Dhubri district, Assam, disclosed this. Besides, reports of June 21, 2002 have expressed the apprehension that the Al Qaeda might spread its network across the State. Fleeing Al Qaeda terrorists are looking for safe houses after the US campaign against them started in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US. These cadres, reports indicate, might turn to the Islamist terrorist outfits in the State to secure safe houses.

According to intelligence sources, the ISI had backed the formation of the AMULFA, of which MULTA and MULFA are members. The sources also claim that the ISI is even providing training to these two outfits in the Syleth district of Bangladesh under the command of one Rustom Ali, who is said to be a former Pakistani Army officer. Sources further claim that the AMULFA would finally be linked with the United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFSS), in ISI’s larger plan to destabilise the Northeast region.

There have also been reports indicating that MULTA has been receiving help from the Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) of Bangladesh, a fundamentalist group that is a member of the ruling coalition in that country.

Area of Operation & Activities

Dhubri district of Assam has witnessed the maximum number of incidents involving MULTA terrorists. A MULTA cadre whose arrest was reported in the media on July 4, 2002 confessed to the police that the passage along the International Border in the Golokganj area of Dhubri district is used as a route to infiltrate into the State from Bangladesh. Nagaon and Morigaon districts of Assam have also witnessed MULTA activities. A few of its cadres have been arrested in Darrang district, too. Moreover MULTA allegedly maintains base in Jiribam sub-division of Manipur.

Extortion from the local population in the areas it operates, abductions for ransom and the illegal arms manufacture and trade in them have been identified as the main activities of the outfit. The outfit's cadres have also been involved in committing murders. For instance, a MULTA terrorist killed son of the Deputy chief of Dhubri city police on April 14, 2002. Besides, the outfit, allegedly at the behest of the ISI, has also plans to create communal disturbances in Assam. This was stated in media reports on August 30, 2002, quoting Assam Inspector General of Police Siba Brata Kakati. Further, an unnamed intelligence official was quoted in the same report as saying that approximately 30 MULTA terrorists were waiting to cross into Assam after having completed training in Bangladesh.

Finance

Reportedly extortion is a major source for its finances. The sale of illegal weapons is another source to finance its activities. In fact, several MULTA terrorists were arrested on the charges of illegal arms manufacture and their sale.

Incidents

2011

·         January 25: Three militants belonging to MULTA, identified as Sabu Ali, Hashmat Ali and Hashimuddin Ali, were arrested by the Security Forces in the Malipara areas of Kamrup District. The SFs also recovered one 7.62 pistol, a rifle and nine live cartridges from the militants.

2010

·         September 21: BSF troops of the Assam and Meghalaya frontier killed four militants of ULFA and Military Council of the KLNLF, arrested 17 militants belonging to the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), KLNLF, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Military Council faction of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) among others. They also got nine militants of ULFA, NDFB and All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA) to surrender along with arms and ammunition.

·         August 27: A MULTA cadre, Hazrat Ali (40), was arrested along with three crude bombs by the BSF from number 10 riverine village of Dhubri District.

·         July 25: Security sources said that so far the Pakistani ISI and other forces inimical to India have not sent their operatives to Assam to carry out subversive activities as the militant groups active in the State are indulging in such acts, but such possibility in future cannot be ruled out. Sources also said that the outfits like the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) and the MULTA are not very active at present. However, the MULTA 'chairman' Abdur Rahman is still in Bangladesh, sources added.

·         July 12: Assam Environment and Forest Minister Rokybul Hussain informed the State Legislative Assembly that militants killed 1,549 civilians and 205 Security Forces (SFs) between 2001 and June 2010. In the armed encounters between the SFs and the militants of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) etc, 1,703 militants were killed during this period. 144 innocent persons were killed when SFs opened fire to bring law and order situation under control during the period.

The Minister said that in the incidents of encounter between the SFs and the militants, 26 civilians were killed during the period. During this period, 2,043 ULFA cadres, 899 NDFB cadres and 102 KLNLF cadres surrendered before the Government and 10,242 members of various militant outfits were arrested. He also told the House that so far six ULFA leaders and 53 cadres of the outfit are in jail and between January 1, 2010 and June 30, 2010 two of its leaders and 164 cadres were released on bail. The Government is interested in holding talks with ULFA, he said.

Further, he said the House that six militant outfits are active in the State at present. These organisations include-ULFA, NDFB, All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), Hmar People's Convention- Democracy (HPC-D), Muslim United Liberation Tiger of Assam (MULTA) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). According to him seven new outfits are active - Liberation Democratic Council of Mising Land (LDCM), United Tribal Liberation Front (UTLF), United Tribal Revolutionary Army (UTRA), Dimasa National Liberation Front (DNLF), Gorkha Liberation Army (GLA), Hills Tiger Force (HTF) and Santhal Tiger Force (STF) have come to light, said the Minister.

·         June 18: A MULTA cadre, Hussain Ali, was arrested by the Security Forces from Chirakuti village in Dhubri District.

·         June 15: Four suspected militants of a Muslim insurgent outfit were arrested by the Police as they were coming from Sonitpur District, from the 6th Mile area of the Guwahati city. Four pistols and 1.5 kilogram explosives were recovered from the possession of the militants, Police said.

·         June 13: A MULTA cadre, Anshar Ali, was arrested in a joint operation by the SFs at Saopata village under Bilasipara Police Station of Dhubri District.

·         May 21: A surrendered MULTA cadre, Umar Farooque (30), was arrested by the SFs from Lalkura village in Dhubri District. He was acting as a NDFB linkman.

·         May 20: A MULTA cadre, identified as Billal Hossain, was arrested by SFs at Kumri in Goalpara District.

·         May 18: A MULTA cadre was arrested by SFs at Tarai bari under Goalpara Police Station in Goalpara District. He was identified as Saher Ali of Kuthipara village in Bongaigaon District.

·         May 2: SFs neutralised an arms and explosives-manufacturing factory at Kathaldi char (River Island) under Bilasipara Police Station in Dhubri District. One MULTA militant, Abu Bakkar Mondal, a resident of Kathaldi char, was arrested. A revolver and four rounds of ammunition were recovered from his possession. SFs also recovered a huge amount of equipment used to manufacture weapons and bombs and one Improvised Explosive Device (IED) from Mondal's residence, where he had allegedly been running the factory. Sources said, "Abu Bakkar Mondal confessed that he had been supplying the arms, ammunition and explosives to the militants groups (names not disclosed) operating in this part of the region."

·         April 24: The NDFB and ULFA formed and nurtured several radical outfits like MULTA to get logistical support, shelter and passage in minority-dominated Districts of lower Assam. Also, the arrest of a MULTA cadre in Dhubri District on April 23, has unravelled involvement of MULTA in drug peddling. Four months ago, two MULTA cadres had been arrested with 400 grams of brown sugar in Meghalaya's Garo Hills District on December 29, 2009.

Sources said that MULTA that stepped up its drug-peddling activities after intensive counter-insurgency operations against the ULFA and the NDFB, which have been supporting it reduced its strength considerably. Sources mentioned, "This is evident from the fact that many youths of minority community belonging to the NDFB or acting as its linkmen have been arrested from the lower Assam districts in the past few years." The source added, "The ISI is sitting at the helm of affairs and controlling the situation in the Northeast from Bangladesh and the fundamentalist organisations are carrying out their activities under the umbrella of Ulfa and the NDFB without much hue and cry." The report adds that it took a long time for the intelligence agencies to understand that ULFA and the NDFB were using these fundamentalist organisations as their conduit.

Meanwhile, sources also said that no direct link had been found between the MULTA and any National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) faction. But since MULTA's patrons, ULFA and the NDFB, camped in Bangladesh and had tactical understanding with the NSCN factions for logistical support, it could be involved in arms racket, mentioned sources. The strategic location of Dhubri serves their purpose very well as the District shares an international border with Bangladesh, inter-State boundaries with Meghalaya and West Bengal and is in close proximity to Bhutan. All the narcotics routed to this part of the region come through Bangladesh. The Police and the Army have seized brown sugar five times in the past three years. Sources said though MULTA had lost considerable strength and was lying low at present, it was not totally depleted.

·         April 23: A militant belonging to MULTA was arrested by the Security Forces at Paglahat area in Dhubri District. Police said that brown sugar worth INR 0.4 million in the international market was recovered from his possession. He was also involved in drug trafficking and arms dealing.

·         April 2: Two MULTA cadres, Paiudding Ahmed and Jainal Ali, were arrested by the SFs from the Patgaon Jainaryarea under Serfanguri Police Station of Kokrajhar District. Two grenades were recovered from their possession.

·         April 1: A MULTA cadre, Johan Uddin, was arrested by SFs from Diabari village under Bilasipara Police Station of Dhubri District. A pistol with ammunition was recovered from his possession.

·         March 29: Assam Forest Minister Rockybul Hussain in the State Legislative Assembly said that among the active militant groups, the ULFA has a strength of 875 cadres, while the anti-talk faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) has 225 cadres, AANLA has 30 cadres, Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) has 40 cadres, Hmar People's Convention- Democracy (HPC-D) has 50 cadres, MULTA has 110 cadres and Assam unit of the Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin has 45 cadres. The Minister further said that the Unified Command structure is active in the State for launching coordinated operations against militants. The Minister informed the House that in the last two years, 535 persons, including 494 civilians and 41 SFs, were killed by militants, while, during the same period, 333 militants were killed by SFs in counter-insurgency operations. He added that two outfits, Bircha Commando Force (BCF) and Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), are in suspension of operation with the State Government and two others- BW and KLNLF laid down arms to join the mainstream.

·         March 2: A suspected MULTA militant, Nurul Islam, was arrested by the SFs from Silongoni of Nagaon District. A pistol and one round of ammunition were recovered from his possession.

·         February 18: Two MULTA cadres were arrested by the Army from Agomoni in Dhubri District. The cadres were identified as Jahinur Islam and Ahidur Islam. An Italian-made pistol, five rounds of live ammunition and two Bangladeshi subscriber identity module cards were recovered from their possession.

·         January 14: Two MULTA cadres, identified as Abdus Salam and Noor Islam, were arrested by Security Forces (SFs) from Rakhaldubi area under Baguan Police Station of Goalpara District.

2009

·         December 16: A MULTA cadre, Kashim Ali (45), is arrested by the Border Security Force (BSF) personnel along India-Bangladesh border. One pistol and five live ammunitions were recovered from his possession. He belongs to Majerchar village in Dhubri District.

·         October 12: One MULTA cadre, identified as Osman Gani (32), was arrested by the Army personnel from Nayagaon area of Dhubri District.

·         September 9: A MULTA cadre, identified as Elahi Sheikh, was arrested by the Police from the Pipulbari village in Dhubri District.

·         July 31: The Assam Rifles personnel arrested one MULTA militant, identified as Gulbahar Mozumdar (28), from a Tezpur-bound passenger bus near Gatanga under Bebejia Police outpost in Sonitpur.

·         June 28: SFs arrested two MULTA militants from Patradisa, about four kilometres from the Bakalaiaghat Police Station in Nagaon District. The duo was identified as Nijam Uddin Ahmed (19) and Mustaque Ahmed (20) of Uttarsamurali area under Murazhar Police Station. Eight detonators, four safety fuse wires and two kilograms of explosive materials were recovered from their possession.

·         June 23: Assam Police personnel arrested a MULTA militant, identified as Mohammad Sahidul Islam (20), from his residence at Nimtola Bahalmukh village under Mairabari Police Station in Nagaon District. One Chinese MM pistol was recovered from his possession.

·         June 11: The personnel of Assam Rifles arrested two MULTA militants from Lankai Sapori area of Sonitpur District.

·         May 14: SFs arrested three MULTA cadres, identified as Rabiul sheikh (22), Habizur Rahman (22) and Zakaria Sarkar (18) from Kumarganj market in Kokrajhar District.

·         April 27: SFs neutralized a locally-made pistol factory run by the MULTA at Kathandi area under Bilasipara Police station of Dhubri District. Five MULTA cadres were also arrested and a large number of tools along with one locally-made pistol and seven rounds of ammunition were recovered. The arrested militants were identified as Abu Bakar Mondal, Abdul Ahmed Mondal, Saher Ali, Jahangir Ali and Hasan Ali. All four are from Kathandi area in Bilasipara and the other is from Jaleswar of Kokrajhar.

·         April 21: Three MULTA militants, identified as Jehirul Islam (26), Sahabuddin Ali (26), and Harmus Ali (25) of Nagaon District, were arrested at Rajapathar in the Karbi Anglong District.

·         April 20: The Army killed five militants, including an accused in the Dhekiajuli blast of April 15, during an encounter at Aka Basti in the Sonitpur District. Out of the five militants, Prabhat Basumatary, Krishna Basumatary and Deithang Basumatary belonged to the NDFB while Babul Ali and Yunis Ali were of the MULTA. Defence spokesman Colonel Rajesh Kalia said the militants were planning to abduct a businessman, Paras Gurung, of Lokhra area in the same district. The army said Prabhat Basumatary was a known operative of Pakistan's ISI and a key perpetrator in the bomb blast at Dhekiajuli. The army recovered five 9-mm pistols, a Chinese hand grenade, five kilograms of explosives, 10 detonators and 107 rounds of AK-47 ammunition from the encounter site. Another army official said, "We had information about the Ranjan Daimary faction of the NDFB working hand-in-hand with Muslim fundamentalist groups."

The Police, however, said the slain persons had no links with militant groups but were a gang of dacoits. An unnamed senior Police official said, "Prabhat Basumatary is a dreaded dacoit arrested several times earlier. He has no links with the NDFB or the Dhekiajuli blast. The blast was carried out by ULFA."

·         April 4: One MULTA militant, identified as Akbar Ali, was arrested by the 21st Jat Regiment from his residence at Char-Bidyapara under Dhubri Police Station of Dhubri District. Two crude bombs, each weighing five kilograms were recovered from his residence.

·         March 13: One MULTA militant, identified as Nakul Ali, was arrested by the Police from Kathonibari area under Thelamara Police Station of Sonitpur District.

·         March 7: The Army arrested a MULTA militant, identified as Akramal Ali, from Kadamguri village under Gossaigaon Police station in the Kokrajhar District. A revolver and two 9-mm pistol bullets were recovered from his possession.

·         March 4: One MULTA militant, identified as Akbar Ali, was arrested by the 21st Jat Regiment of Indian Army from Char-Bidyapara area under Dhubri Police Station of Dhubri District. Two crude bombs, each weighing five kilograms, were recovered from his house.

·         February 28: 45 militants, including 32 ULFA cadres, six KLNLF cadres, five NDFB cadres and a cadre each of the MULTA and PLF-M, surrendered along with a huge quantity of arms and ammunition before Red Horns Division of Indian Army in a surrender ceremony organized at Rangiya of Kamrup District.

·         February 19: One MULTA cadre, identified as Imtiaz Ahmed, was arrested by the Army personnel from C.R. Das Road in Dhubri Town.

·         February 16: The Police arrested one MULTA militant, identified as Saiful Islam, at Samuguri Bajiagaon in the Nagaon District.

·         February 9: A MULTA militant, identified as Habibar Ali, was arrested by SFs along with two bombs from Phulgasa village under Fakirganj Police Station in the Dhubri District.

·         February 6: SFs arrested five MULTA militants from Gauripur in the Dhubri District along the India-Bangladesh border.

·         January 24: Two MULTA militants, Sahidur Rahman and Nasiruddin, were arrested by the SF personnel. While Sahidur Rahman was arrested from Sadartilla along the Assam-Bangladesh border, Nasiruddin was arrested from Kaliabor in the Nagaon District. According to Police sources, they had links with the DGFI of Bangladesh.

·         January 23: The Guwahati City Police arrested a MULTA militant, Mohammad Dilwar, from Sarabbhati area. Police sources added that Mohammad Dilwar is a Bangladeshi national and some Bangladeshi currency and documents were recovered from his possession.

·         January 22: The SFs arrested two MULTA militants, identified as Hatem Ali and Fazrul Ali, from Sirajuli area under Dhekiajuli Police Station in the Sonitpur District.

·         January 16: Seven hardcore militants of the MULTA were arrested from the Chapar and Gouripur areas of Dhubri District. They were identified as Abdul Rahman, Abdul Mazid Sheikh, Nazrul Islam, Akhrul Zaman Talukdar, Halim Ali, Kamizuddin and Mokiul Islam Miah. A locally-made pistol, two hand grenades, seven rounds of AK-47 rifle ammunition were recovered from their possession, Police sources said.

·         January 12: The Assam Government stated in the Legislative Assembly that eight militant groups, including the ULFA, KLNLF, Black Widow, AANLA, KRA, HuM, MULTA and HPC-D, are active in the State. Forest Minister Rockybul Hussain said that both the ULFA and NDFB are carrying out subversive activities in Assam under the influence of foreign powers and top leaders of the outfit are staying abroad. He further said that in 2008, 124 militants belonging to various outfits were killed and over 1300 were arrested. The Security Forces also recovered 203 bombs and 202 grenades from the militants.

2008

·         December 7: SFs arrested a MULTA militant, identified as Hafizur Rahman, from Bhomrabil under Gossaigaon police station in the Kokrajhar district. A pistol was recovered from his possession.

·         November 26: Three MULTA militants were arrested by the Army from Dalaigaon village in the Morigaon district. They were identified as Mohammed Dadul, Habibur and Azizul Haque. The Army also recovered one 7.62 mm SLR, one .22 pistol, one SLR magazine, four rounds of ammunition and one mobile phone from their possession.

·         November 19: Three unidentified MULTA cadres were arrested by the security force personnel from Sonitpur district.

·         October 25: The Dhubri District Police seized crude arms and explosives from a factory at Tambakubari-I village under Bogribari police station. Khaibor Ali, an arms supplier who used to run the factory, was arrested. Police claimed to have foiled plans to trigger a blast in the run-up to Diwali (Festival of Light) celebrations. The factory supplied firearms and ammunition to militant groups, including the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) and bandit gangs operating in lower Assam districts. Police seized 30 hand-made live ammunition of rifles, 197 empty cartridges of revolvers and pistols, 1 kilogram of explosives and 1.5kilogram of lead. However, five persons engaged in manufacturing arms and ammunition managed to escape.

·         October 14: Two militants of the MULTA, Abdul Mannan and Samsul Haque, were arrested by security forces from the Kachuwa Gadhara area of Nagaon district. They also deposited two grenades and a pistol.

·         August 13: One MULTA cadre, Muslim Ali, is wounded by troops during an encounter at Muslim Ghopa village in the Darrang district.

·         June 17 : Security forces arrested four suspected MULTA cadres in the Nagaon district. They were identified as Mohammed Akbar Ali, Jamar Ali, Eman Hussain and Jafar Ali.

·         April 5: Two MULTA cadres are arrested by Army personnel from Chatguri-Jangirkilla in the Dhubri district.

·         April 1: The Assam Government stated in the Legislative Assembly that 234 Islamist militants were currently lodged in different jails in the State. The 234 militants include as many as 150 belonging to the MULTA, 50 to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and seven Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operatives.

·         January 7: A Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Asom (MULTA) militant, identified as Razizul Haque Byapari, surrendered before security force personnel in Guwahati along with a 9 mm revolver with two rounds of ammunition.

2007

·         November 7: The Army arrested one MULTA militant, Moinul Haque, from Uttar Raipur area under Golokganj police station in the Dhubri district.

·         July 14: Police recovered the dead body of a civilian, identified as Ibrahim Ali, from Fakirganj police station in the Dhubri district. Ali was abducted by the suspected MULTA militants one and half month back.

·         June 5: Police arrested one unidentified MULTA cadre from Fakiragram in the Kokrajhar district along with an Improvised Explosive Device weighing three kilograms.

·         March 18: Two MULTA cadres, Rizaul Islam and Zamuruddin, were arrested by the Army personnel during a search operation at Madhusolmari near Gauripur in the Dhubri district.

·         March 14: Two MULTA militants, Zilani Sheikh and Zahirul Ali, were arrested from Balajan Lalpura in the Dhubri district. One pistol and a bomb were recovered from them.

·         January 29: Three MULTA cadres, Kalu Sheikh, Abdul Jalil and Tamiruddin Sheikh, are arrested during a search operation at Sesapani area in the Kokrajhar district. A revolver with three rounds of ammunition was recovered from their possession.

·         January 22: A ULFA militant, Bikash Roy alias Mallic Ahmed, is arrested from a rented house at Panjabari area in Guwahati. Bikash reportedly worked for the ULFA as an agent of the MULTA. Some incriminating documents were recovered from his possession indicating his close rapport with a section of politicians. He was involved in the January 9-bomb blast in Dispur, the capital of Assam.

·         January 5: Three suspected MULTA cadres are arrested from Sater Alga village in the Dhubri district. A bomb and 500 grams of explosives are recovered from their hideout.

2006

·         December 25: A MULTA cadre, Nishan Ali, is arrested from Demdema village in the Dhubri district. A bomb is recovered from his possession.

·         December 24: The Army and the Special Branch of Assam Police arrest Matibur Rahman, a cadre of Black Widow, anti-talk faction of the DHD led by the Jwel Gorlosa, from Pailang village in the Cachar district. Rahman reportedly confessed to have been recruited by the Black Widow for maintaining link with Manipur-based PULF, Pakistan's Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) and LeT. The report adds that PULF had tied up with the MULTA and MULFA, and extended its operation to Barak Valley.

·         December 6: A MULTA cadre, Nabab Ali, is arrested by security force personnel during a search operation at Bokola village under Jamuguri police station in the Sonitpur district.

·         November 30: Two suspected MULTA militants, Inamul Hussain and Zamila Begum, are arrested from Tinghoriadoom Gaon under Tinghoria police outpost in the Tinsukia district. Four detonators are recovered from their possession. Based on their confession, six persons were arrested subsequently for interrogation.

·         November 29: The Inspector General of BSF for the Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur and Nagaland frontiers, Jyoti Prakash Sinha, said that at least 14 cadres belonging to the MULTA and MULFA were sent to Bangladesh to study religion. But they received arms training there and came back to the Northeast. He also mentions that Pakistan's ISI is clandestinely working in Bangladesh to bring all Northeast-based insurgent outfits and Jihadi elements to work under one umbrella.

·         November 1: A suspected MULTA cadre, Matiur Rahman, is arrested by security force personnel during a search operation at Jhaskal Ditiya Khanda village under Golakganj police station in the Dhubri district. A huge cache of live cartridges of AK-47 rifle is recovered from his possession.

·         July 21: The four MULTA militants, including the self-styled ‘commander’ Nur Islam alias Limbu, who were arrested by Assam Police on July 18, are reported to have confessed that at least 20 cadres of their outfit used Shillong and Lad Rymbai in Jaintia Hills of Meghalaya as their routes to escape to Bangladesh in recent past.

·         July 18: Guwahati City Police arrests a self-styled ‘commander’ of the MULTA, Nur Islam alias Lambu, from the Ambari area. Reports said that at least 20 MULTA cadres have gone from Assam to Bangladesh passing though Meghalaya for training.

·         March 29: Army personnel, following a MULTA cadre Quasim Ali, recover four bombs from a house in the Goalpara district.

·         January 22: Three suspected MULTA cadres are arrested from the Dhubri and Golokganj police station areas along the India-Bangladesh border of Dhubri district. One .38 revolver, one handmade pistol, three rounds of live cartridges and a demand note of Rupees 26,000 are recovered from two MULTA cadres, Mohibul Hoque and Shohidul Hoque of Hoverpara village. Five grenades weighing one kilogram each and some incriminating documents are recovered from the third, identified as Aminul Hoque of Darbarpara village.

2005

·         November 27: Three ULFA cadres, identified as Sirajul Haq, Bogen Neog and Ritu Sarma, and a MULTA cadre, Moinul Haq, surrender before the Superintendent of Police in the Dhubri district.

·         July 31: Acting on a tip off, the Dhubri district police arrest two suspected MULTA cadres from a hide out in Chagolia along the Assam-West Bengal border. The arrested militants, identified as Ashraful Hussain and Baschu Mian, hail from Nakkati Nagar in the Coochbehar district of West Bengal.

·         July 21: A MULTA cadre, Abuwal Hussain, is arrested from Bidyardabri Part V village in the Dhubri district.

·         July 20: A MULTA cadre, Moinul Haque alias Laden, is arrested at Sindurai under Golokganj police station in the Dhubri district.

·         March 14: Assam Home Minister, Rockybul Hussain, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, discloses that 4,768 terrorists have surrendered in the State between January 2001 and February 2005. He says that the surrendered include 1168 ULFA, 776 NDFB, 2648 BLT, 48 MULTA and 4 NSCN cadres.

·         February 5: Lumding police arrest two MULTA cadres, belonging to the Naukhuti village of Nagaon district. A pistol, a revolver, a sten gun and a rifle are recovered from their possession.

2004

·         September 22: A MULTA cadre, Dadul Ali, is arrested from the Urimghat area of Golaghat district along with a SBBL gun and a pistol.

·         September 19: Assam Police arrests a MULTA cadre from Hatsinghimari in the Dhubri district and recover a pistol and 25 rounds of ammunition from him.

·         September 7: A MULTA cadre, Mohammed Abdul Laskar, is arrested at Lanka in the Nagaon district recently. A 9mm pistol is recovered from his possession.

·         September 5: A girl student, who is abducted two months ago by Wajid Ahmed, brother of Sayed Sabir Ahmed, 'commander-in-chief' of the MULTA, is rescued by the Assam Police from New Delhi and brought back to the Nagaon district.

·         September 1: Security forces recover at least 50 high-velocity electronic detonators from a private residence at Baghahat under Sonai block in the Cachar district. A person, identified as Mohammed Ibomcha, suspected to have links with either the PLA of Manipur or the MULTA was arrested in this connection.

·         August 30: A MULTA cadre, Nur Hussain, surrenders before the Army at the Bashbari camp in Dhubri district.

·         August 28: Cachar district is put on maximum alert amidst reports that the ULFA is collaborating with the MULTA and PULF to carry out subversive activities in the district.

·         August 27: At least 70 terrorists, including 47 ULFA, 11 NDFB, 8 BTF and 4 MULTA cadres, surrender at the 5 Assam Rifles camp at Chardwar in the Sonitpur district. They also deposit arms and ammunitions, including AK 47 rifles, 9 mm pistols, revolver and 264 live ammunitions.

·         July 30: Nagaon 'district commander' of the MULTA, Sayed Sabi Ahmed, is arrested from Dimaruguri on charges of extortion.

·         May 22: At least forty-seven terrorists, including 20 ULFA, 25 NDFB and 2 MULTA cadres, surrender along with 42 assorted weapons to the Army authorities at Tamulpur in the Nalbari district of Assam.

·         April 12: Lohit Nath, a student of Class IX of Kokrajhar Higher Secondary School, who is abducted by suspected MULTA cadres on March 18, 2004, is released after 25 days at Latapara under Bilasipara subdivision.

·         April 6: Army personnel arrest a MULTA cadre, Abdul Khalek, from Khalihamari village in the Nagaon district.

·         March 29: A MULTA cadre surrenders along with arms and ammunition before Lt Gen. Anup S. Jamawal, General-Officer-Commanding of the Army's Gajraj Corps at Tezpur.

·         March 18: Suspected MULTA cadres abduct Lohit Nath, a student of Class IX of Kokrajhar Higher Secondary School.

·         February 24: A MULTA cadre, identified as Sakimuddin Haque alias Ilias Bhutto, is arrested by the Army at Paglahat Bazaar under Golakganj police station in the Dhubri district. He is reported to have close links with the ULFA.

·         January 31: At least 156 terrorists including 53 ULFA, 91 NDFB, 4 BTF and 4 MULTA cadres surrender at Tamulpur in the Nalbari district.

·         January 28: Thirteen cadres belonging to the ULFA, NDFB and MULTA surrender before security force personnel.

·         January 3: Two MULTA cadres surrender to the army at Laipuli in the Tinsukia district.

2003

·         December 31: One MULTA terrorist surrenders in Jorhat.

·         November 26: One MULTA terrorist is arrested in the Cooch Behar district of North Bengal.

·         October 30: A MULTA terrorist, identified as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, is arrested from Bogulamari village in the Dhubri district of Assam.

·         October 10: A MULTA terrorist, identified as Nurul Haque, who was allegedly involved in illegal arms smuggling from Bangladesh to Assam, is arrested on an unspecified date from Geelaldah in the Cooch Behar district of West Bengal.

·         August 17: MULTA cadre surrenders with two AK-47 rifles and an unspecified quantity of ammunition before the police in Dhubri district.

·         June 19: Media reports indicate that terrorist outfits, including the ULFA, the NDFB and the MULTA, among others, are currently active in Dhubri district.

·         June 14: MULTA terrorist Abdul Ali is arrested from the outfit's hideout at Larkuchi under Mukalmua police station limits in Nalbari district.

·         June 5: Reports indicates that MULTA terrorists under the leadership of Najimullah have intensified their activities among the minority community in Dhubri district along the India-Bangladesh border.

·         June 2: Police in the Kokrajhar district destroy a MULTA camp at Bengtol in the Indo-Myanmar border area.

• May 21: Report indicates that a group of 28 MULTA terrorists led by a ‘second lieutenant’ Abdul Jalil have infiltrated into Assam from Bangladesh.

• May 20: Reports indicate that MULTA has ‘purchased’ 55 houses in the Sylhet district of Bangladesh in 2003 to shelter recruits and some leaders of the outfit from Assam.

• May 2: Two MULTA terrorists surrender to the police in Dhubri district with a pistol and 36 grenades.

• March 26: MULTA 'sergeant' arrested from an unnamed place in Nagaon district.

• March 8: Three MULTA terrorists are arrested in Lalkura village, Golokganj police station-limits, Dhubri district, while on an extortion bid.

• January 19: Three MULTA terrorists arrested from Hatigaon area in Guwahati.

2002

·         December 3: Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) extremist Manowar Hussain alias Yearuddin is arrested from a place under Bogribari police station-limits

·         September 24: Police arrest MULTA Dhubri 'district commander' Md Abdur Rahman from Uchita village, Golokganj police station-limits, Assam.

·         September 18: Two MULTA terrorists make an unsuccessful bid to abduct a local businessman from Panikhaiti area, Nagaon police station-limits.

·         August 30: Reports say police sources indicated that MULTA, along with other terrorist outfits, is championing the ‘Islamic cause’ and might spread communal hatred in Assam

·         August 19: Police arrest two MULTA terrorists––Jamaluddin Sheikh and Abdus Salam––from Jhulan mela), an annual traditional fair held in Dhubri district, Assam, for their alleged involvement in illegal arms trade.

·         July 22: Six MULTA terrorists surrender in Dhubri district.

·         July 9: MULTA terrorist arrested for allegedly running an illegal gun-making factory in Boyjer Alga Char area, Bilasipara, Dhubri district.

·         July 8: Security forces arrest one MULTA cadre each from Nagaon and Golaghat districts, following the interrogation of another a cadre arrested earlier at Panbari, Dhubri district.

·         July 4: Intelligence sources say MULTA is receiving help from the Jamat-e-Islami (JeI), a fundamentalist political party of Bangladesh and a member of the ruling coalition.

·         June 26: Report says two arrested MULTA terrorists revealed during interrogation that the son of Dhubri district police deputy chief was killed by a MULTA terrorist, on April 14, at Belguri village, Golakganj police station limits, Dhubri district.

·         January 11: Report says a MULTA terrorist was among the 34 terrorists killed in various incidents in Kamrup in the year 2001.

2001

·         September 23: Five MULTA cadres arrested by security forces in Assam's Darrang district

·         26 January: Four MULTA, besides 134 from various outfits, surrender to Assam Governor Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S.K. Sinha at the Republic Day function in Guwahati.

2000

·         October 24: 10 MULTA terrorists, besides 53 from various other outfits, surrender to Assam Governor Sinha and Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta at Bilasipara, Dhubri district.

·         March 31: Abdul Jalil Ragbi, Assam Jamiat Ulama vice-president denies, in Guwahati, the presence of MULTA or MULFA in Assam.

·         January 25: Security forces arrest four MULTA terrorists from Nalbari and one more from Jorang Pathar village in Nagaon district, Assam.

1996

·         MULTA founded sometime in the year.

Note: Compiled from news reports.